KnowBe4 Human error. Conquered.

A Master Class on Cybersecurity: Roger Grimes Teaches Password Best Practices

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About Roger

- 34 years plus in computer security, 20 years pen testing
- Expertise in host and network security, IdM, crypto, PKI, APT, honeypot, cloud security
- Consultant to world's largest companies and militaries for decades
- Previous worked for Foundstone, McAfee, Microsoft
- Written 13 books and over 1,200 magazine articles
- InfoWorld and CSO weekly security columnist 2005 -2019
- Frequently interviewed by magazines (e.g. Newsweek) and radio shows (e.g. NPR's All Things Considered)

Certification exams passed include:

- CPA
- CISSP
- CISM, CISA
- MCSE: Security, MCP, MVP
- CEH, TISCA, Security+, CHFI
- yada, yada

Roger's Books

Professional

Windows

Desktop and Server Hardening

HACKING MULTIFACTOR AUTHENTICATION



Cryptography Apocalypse Preparing for the Day When Quantum Computing Breaks Today's Crypto





RANSOMWARE PROTECTION PLAYBOOK

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WILEY



LEARN FROM THE EXPERTS WHO TAKE DOWN HACKERS

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Honeypots

for Windows



O'REILLY*

Roger A. Grimes



Apress

About Us

- Provider of the world's largest integrated Security Awareness Training and Simulated Phishing platform
- Based in Tampa Bay, Florida, founded in 2010
- CEO & employees are ex-antivirus, IT Security pros
- We help tens of thousands of organizations manage the ongoing problem of social engineering
- Winner of numerous industry awards











Agenda

Types of Password Attacks and DefensesPassword Policy Recommendations



Password Policy Practical Implementation





For more detail: https://info.knowbe4.com/wp-password-policy-should-be

Problems with Passwords

- Biggest password problem and risk today
- The average person has to logon to 170+ websites and only has 3 to 19 passwords
- This means one compromise able to leverage other compromises more easily



Passwords Will Be With Us For a Long Time

- If you added up all the password alternatives in the world they don't work on 2% of the world's sites and services
- Average person has more than ever
- Passwords are used in many scenarios beyond user use:
 - Networks
 - Computers/Devices
 - Services/daemons
 - Applications
 - Interfaces

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/passwords-still-us-decades-roger-grimes



Agenda

Types of Password Attacks and Defenses
Password Policy Recommendations



In General, They Can Be Categorized Into

- Password theft
- Password guessing
- Password hash theft and cracking
- Unauthorized password resetting or bypass



Popular Password Attack Types

Stealing – Lots of Ways:

- Social engineering
- Malware on the endpoint
- Hackers on the endpoint or network
- Network eavesdropping
- Stolen credential databases
- Accidentally left in publicly accessible "beta" code (e.g., GitHub, etc.)
- Stolen from other compromised site/service
- Shoulder surfing



Popular Password Attack Types

Social Engineering

- One of the most common ways to get passwords
- Email, websites, SMS, IM, social media, phone call, etc.



Popular Password Attack Types

Social Engineering

- One of the most common ways to get passwords
- Email, websites, S

O Instagram

Hi Roger

Someone tried to log in to your Instagra

If this wasn't you, please use the followi confirm your identity.Please sign in:

453212





Popular Password Attack Types

Stealing

- Malware on the endpoint
 - Trickbot is the most common right now

Indeed, Holden shared records of communications from VCPI's tormentors suggesting they'd unleashed Trickbot to steal passwords from infected VCPI endpoints that the company used to log in at *more than 300 Web sites and services*, including:

-Identity and password management platforms Autho and LastPass
-Multiple personal and business banking portals;
-Microsoft Office365 accounts
-Direct deposit and Medicaid billing portals
-Cloud-based health insurance management portals
-Numerous online payment processing services
-Cloud-based payroll management services
-Prescription management services
-Commercial phone, Internet and power services
-Medical supply services
-State and local government competitive bidding portals
-Online content distribution networks
-Shipping and postage accounts
-Amazon, Facebook, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter accounts

Popular Password Attack Types

Stealing

- Hackers on the endpoint or network
 - Empire PowerShell Toolkit
 - Mimikatz
 - Metasploit

mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)

Authentication Id	:	0 ; 173747 (00000000:0002a6b3)
Session	:	Interactive from 1
User Name	:	Administrator
Domain	:	VICTIMMACHINE
Logon Server	:	VICTIMMACHINE
Logon Time	:	7/10/2019 4:25:57 PM
SID	:	S-1-5-21-1399973682-244801238-2328893529-500
msv :		
[0000003]]	Primary
* Username	e	: Administrator
* Domain		: VICTIMMACHINE
* NTLM		: ae974876d974abd805a989ebead86846





Popular Password Attack Types

Stealing

- Network eavesdropping
 - Man-the-middle attacks
 - Capturing challenge-response sess
 - Responder hacking tool for one
 - https://github.com/SpiderLabs/F

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[SMB] Requested Share : \\192.168.56.20\IPC\$	
[SMBv2] NTLMv2-SSP Client : 107.144.147.37	
[SMBv2] NTLMv2-SSP Username : DESKTOP-LBG6PJ7\kevin	
[SMBv2] NTLMv2-SSP Hash : kevin::DESKTOP-LBG6PJ7:8	043882a065a4c39:AC65DF59233C29B26EB
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https://blog.knowbe4.com/kevin-mitnick-demos-password-hack-no-link-click-or-attachments-necessary



Popular Password Attack Types

GitHub Attacks

How corporate data and secrets leak from GitHub repositories

Attackers constantly search public code repositories like GitHub for secrets developers might inadvertently leave behind, and any tiny mistake can be exploited.

One boring day during the pandemic, security researcher <u>Craig Hays</u> <u>decided to do an experiment</u>. He wanted to leak an SSH username and password into a GitHub repository and see if any attacker might find it. Hays thought he'd have to wait a few days, maybe a week, before anyone noticed it. Reality proved more brutal. The first unauthorized login happened within 34 minutes. "The biggest eye-opener for me was how quickly it was exploited," he tells CSO. repository for work projects. According to the <u>State of Secrets Sprawl on</u> <u>GitHub</u> report, 85% of the leaks occur on developers' personal repositories

Over the first 24 hours, six different IP addresses connected to his honeypot a total of nine times. One attacker tried to install a botnet client, while another one attempted to use the server to launch a denial-of-service attack. Hays also saw someone who wanted to steal sensitive information from the server and someone else who was just looking around.

https://www.csoonline.com/article/3634784/how-corporate-data-and-secrets-leak-from-github-repositories.html



Popular Password Attack Types Physical Attacks

Examples

- On wall behind everyone
- Watch person type it in
- Password is on a Post-It note
- Taped to a laptop

• This was on a laptop in a gov't building





Popular Password Attack Types

Because of all the password theft:

- Your password, my password, is everywhere!
- Well, there's a good chance some of our passwords are somewhere
- There are billions of logon names and passwords all over the Internet One Example – Just one password dump collection set
- Collection#1: 770 million email addresses/logon names and password
- Collections#2-5: 2.2 billion records
 - <u>https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2019/02/01/2-2-billion-accounts-found-in-biggest-ever-data-dump-how-to-check-if-youre-a-victim/</u>



Getting Password Dump Info

Password Dump Retrieval Tools:

- There are dozen of OSINT tools hackers can use to find stolen passwords
- Example: Recon-ng

recon/domains-credentials/pwnedlist/account_creds recon/domains-credentials/pwnedlist/api_usage recon/domains-credentials/pwnedlist/domain_creds recon/domains-credentials/pwnedlist/domain_ispwned recon/domains-credentials/pwnedlist/leak_lookup recon/domains-credentials/pwnedlist/leaks_dump

recon/contacts-credentials/hibp_breach
recon/contacts-credentials/hibp_paste

 \land 1 11 /1 Sponsored by... / / / / / / / /// \\/ // \\\\\ \\ \/\ // // BLACK HILLS \/ \\ www.blackhillsinfosec.com [recon-ng v4.9.6, Tim Tomes (@LaNMaSteR53)] [recon-ng][default] >



Checking to See if Your Password Has Been Stolen

Attackers Can Buy/Get It:

 There are hundreds of databases with your email address (and password) for free or for sale on the Internet and darkweb

Bill said he's not sure where the passwords are coming from, but he assumes they are tied to various databases for compromised websites that get posted to password cracking and hacking forums on a regular basis. Bill said this criminal group averages between five and ten million email authentication attempts daily, and comes away with anywhere from 50,000 to 100,000 of working inbox credentials.

In a December 2020 blog post about how Microsoft is moving away from passwords to more robust authentication approaches, the software giant said *an average of one in every 250 corporate accounts is compromised each month*. As of last year, Microsoft had nearly 240 million active users, according to this analysis.

From: https://krebsonsecurity.com/2021/09/gift-card-gang-extracts-cash-from-100k-inboxes-daily/



Checking to See if Your Password Has Been Stolen

Attackers Can Buy/Get It:

 There are hundreds of databases with your email address (and password) for sale on the Internet and darkweb

<u>Defenses:</u>

Research your own passwords availability on the Internet and dark web

- www.knowbe4.com/resources Password Exposure Test
- Sites like: <u>https://haveibeenpwned.com/</u>
- Password managers like 1Password



Password Exposure Test



Checking to See if Your Password Has Been Stolen

pwned?

Attackers Can Buy/Get It:

Protecting Yourself/Org

https://haveibeenpwned.com

';--have i been pwned?

Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach

';--have i been pwned?

Check if you have an account that has been compromised in a data breach

roger@banneretcs.com

pwned?

Good news — no pwnage found! No breached accounts and no pastes (subscribe to search sensitive breaches) Oh no — pwned! Pwned on 10 breached sites and found no pastes (subscribe to search sensitive breaches)



rogerg@knowbe4.com

Password Exposure Test



Here's How the Password Exposure Test works:

- Checks to see if your company domains have been part of a data breach that included passwords
- Tests against 10 types of weak password related threats
- Checks against breached/weak passwords currently in use in your Active Directory
- Reports on the accounts affected and does not show/report on actual passwords
- Just download the install, run it, with results in minutes!

Requirements: Active Directory, Windows 7 or higher (32 or 64 bit) NOTE: the analysis is done on the workstation you install PET on, no confidential data leaves your network, and actual passwords are never disclosed.

» Learn more at https://www.knowbe4.com/password-exposure-test

Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing – Online Logon Prompt

- Guess using one logon name, many guesses
 - Maximum guessing speed limited by application, server response time, network speed and latency, etc.
 - If account lockout or rate throttling ISN'T enabled, attacker can guess from 1 100 or so times a minute per guessing instance
 - Far slower than password hash cracking (cover soon)



Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing Attack Methods

- Worst: Brute force (e.g. a, aa, ab, abc...etc.)
- Better: Dictionary Attack
 - People like to use "root" words for their passwords, in their own language
 - So start with words in dictionary (max. 170K words in Oxford English dictionary)
- Best Use logic based on human behaviors
 - Most people have a "working vocabulary" of 3000 4000, max. 10,000 words
 - Start with the most popular words and passwords first
 - So most password hacking dictionaries contain less than 10,000 words
- Then add "complexity" to the root word (e.g. frog, frog1, fr0g, etc.)



Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing

- Only works with weak passwords or when guessing is allowed to be unlimited
 - *password* is the most common password (also *Password2*, 123456, *admin*, *qwerty*, etc.)

top 25 most common passwords by year according to splashbata								
2011 ^[4]	2012 ^[5]	2013 ^[6]	2014 ^[7]	2015 ^[8]	2016 ^[3]	2017 ^[9]	2018 ^[10]	2019 ^[11]
password	password	123456	123456	123456	123456	123456	123456	123456
123456	123456	password	password	password	password	password	password	123456789
12345678	12345678	12345678	12345	12345678	12345	12345678	123456789	qwerty
qwerty	abc123	qwerty	12345678	qwerty	12345678	qwerty	12345678	password
abc123	qwerty	abc123	qwerty	12345	football	12345	12345	1234567
monkey	monkey	123456789	123456789	123456789	qwerty	123456789	111111	12345678
1234567	letmein	111111	1234	football	1234567890	letmein	1234567	12345
letmein	dragon	1234567	baseball	1234	1234567	1234567	sunshine	iloveyou
	2011 ^[4] password 12345678 12345678 qwerty abc123 monkey 1234567 letmein	2011 ^[4] 2012 ^[5] password password 123456 12345678 12345678 12345678 qwerty abc123 abc123 qwerty abc123 password 12345678 itemain abc123 gwerty	2011 ^[4] 2012 ^[5] 2013 ^[6] password password 123456 123456 12345678 password 12345678 12345678 12345678 qwerty abc123 qwerty abc123 qwerty abc123 monkey monkey 12345678 1234567 letmein 11111	2011 ^[4] 2012 ^[5] 2013 ^[6] 2014 ^[7] password password 123456 123456 123456 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 abc123 qwerty abc123 qwerty monkey monkey 12345678 123456789 1234567 letmein 11111 1234	2011 ^[4] 2012 ^[5] 2013 ^[6] 2014 ^[7] 2015 ^[8] password password 123456 123456 123456 123456 1234567 password password password 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 qwerty abc123 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 monkey monkey 123456789 123456789 123456789 1234567 letmein 11111 1234 football	2011 ^[4] 2012 ^[5] 2013 ^[6] 2014 ^[7] 2015 ^[8] 2016 ^[3] password password 123456 123456 123456 123456 123456 1234567 password password password password password 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 12345678 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 qwerty 12345678 abc123 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 12345678 abc123 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 12345678 abc123 qwerty abc123 qwerty 12345678 12345678 abc124 qwerty 123456789 123456789 123456789 123456789 abc125 thilitit 123456789 123456789 1234567890 1234567890 1234567 termein 11111 12345 1234567 1234567 letmein dragon 1234567 baseball 1234	2011[4]2012[5]2013[6]2014[7]2015[8]2016[3]2017[9]passwordpassword123456123456123456123456123456123456123456passwordpasswordpasswordpasswordpassword12345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678qwertyabc123qwerty12345678qwerty12345678qwertyabc123qwertyabc123qwerty12345678football12345678monkeymonkey123456789123456789123456789qwerty1234567890letmeindragon1234567baseball123412345671234567	2011[4]2012[5]2013[6]2014[7]2015[8]2016[3]2017[9]2018[10]passwordpassword123456123456123456123456123456123456123456123456passwordpasswordpasswordpasswordpasswordpasswordpassword1234567812345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678qwertyabc123qwerty12345678qwerty12345678qwerty12345678abc123qwertyabc123qwerty1234567812345678qwerty12345678monkeymonkey123456789123456789123456789ittiliti1234567letmeindragon1234567baseball123412345671234567isunhine

- 75% of organizations have at least 1 user with a password on a list of 1000 passwords
- Most "complex" passwords aren't really that complex



Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing – Online Logon Prompt

- Example of "long" password guessed, 10-characters
- Attacker was able to guess over a 100,000 times a day for over a year without interruption

Municipality of Hofvan Twente hacked by simple password 'Welkom2020' | NOW

🗇 News 👘 🕚 March 17, 2021 👘 📿 No Comments

https://www.world-today-news.com/municipality-of-hof-van-twente-hacked-by-simple-password-welkom2020-now/



Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing

- Attackers will guess at accessible logon prompts
 - RDP, OWA, O365, Gmail, VPNs, etc.

Outlook Web App		Google Sign in	
Security (show explanation)	Office 365	to continue to Gmail	
 This is a public or shared compt This is a private computer 	Sign in with your organizational account	Email or phone	VPN Connection
Use the light version of Outlook	someone@example.com	Forgot email?	Enter your user authentication
Password:	Password	Not your computer? Use Guest mode to sign in privately. Learn more	Account Name:
	Sign in	Create account	Password:
Connected to Microsoft Exchange © 2010 Microsoft Corporation. All rights re	Can't access your account?		Cancel OK



Hacker Tools to Guess At Passwords

🛿 Brutus - AET2 - www.hoobie.net/brutus - (January 2000)	🛓 Web Brute				
Brutus - AET2 - www.hoobie.net/brutus - (January 2000) Tools Help arget 132.168.1.1 Connection Options Port 443 Connections ↓ 10 Timeout HTTP (Basic Auth) ↓ HTTP (Basic Auth) HTTP (Basic Auth) HT	Web Brute e Edt Yew AMP Help I Launch Browser E Brute Shop Hill Clear Authentication Type Select a HITP Authentication type and click next. If the authentication type requires a domain, please enter it in the text field be Authentication Type Web Form Basic Digest Digest	File View Configure Tools Help Image: Second Secon			
Positive Authentication Results Target Type Username Located and installed 1 authentication plug-ins 02% Timeout Reject Auth Si Table	P P P P P Cancel < Back Next > Using Proxy Address: 127.0.0.1:2960	Target Passwords Tuning Specific Start Output Hydra v4.1 (c) 2004 by van Hauser / THC - use allowed only for legal purposes. Hydra (http://www.thc.org) starting at 2004-05-17 21:58:52 [DATA] 32 tasks, 1 servers, 45380 login tries (I:1/p:45380), ~1418 tries per task [DATA] attacking service ftp on port 21 [STATUS] 14056.00 tries/min, 14056 tries in 00:01h, 31324 todo in 00:03h [STATUS] 14513.00 tries/min, 29026 tries in 00:02h, 16354 todo in 00:02h [21][ftp] host: 127.0.0.1 login: marc password: success Hydra (http://www.thc.org) finished at 2004-05-17 22:01:38 <finished></finished>			

Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing

- Password Credential Stuffing/Spray Attacks
 - Will guess a 100 to 1000 passwords, one-at-a-time, slowly, against many accounts

Akamai: We Saw 61 Billion Credential Stuffing Attacks in 18 Months

In March 2019, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) alerted Citrix they had reason to believe cybercriminals had gained access to the company's internal network. The



FBI told Citrix the hackers likely got in using a technique called "password spraying," a relatively crude but remarkably effective attack that attempts to access a large number of employee accounts (usernames/email addresses) using just a handful of common passwords.



Hackers Love Finding Unprotected Open API to Guess Against

Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) connection points are often accessible over the Internet

- Many require/allow logon authentication
- Can be used for password spray attacks
- May bypass MFA requirements, not have acct lockout, not well monitored
- Akamai said 75% of password spray attacks were against APIs
 - https://www.akamai.com/us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/soti-securityfinancial-services-hostile-takeover-attempts-report-2020.pdf

Password Spray Attack Tools

Tool – Spray

Useage: spray.sh -<typeoflogon> <targetIP> <usernameList> <passwordList>

<AttemptsPerLockoutPeriod> <LockoutPeriodInMinutes> <DOMAIN>

GitHub - SpiderLabs/Spray: A Passw	ord Şoravina tool for Active Directorv Credentials bv	Jacob Wilkin(Gr – 🗉 🗙					
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← → C ^a	^{lub,} File Edit View Search	Terminal Help					
A Most Visited D Offensive Secur	root@kali:~/Spray-mag	ster# ./spray.sh -cisco	sso.cisco.victim.com/	logon.html userlist.txt passwords.txt 20 1440 -v			
🕞 6 commits	rooteka	1:/var/www/html# cp /e					
Branch: master → New pull request	Spray 2.1 the Passwor	d Sprayer by Jacob Will	<pre>kin(Greenwolf)/etc/apac mation.</pre>	che2/logon.html'			
Jacob Wilkin curl -k ignore certificat	16:30:53 Spraying wit	th password: password/e					
name-lists	16:31:05 Spraying with password: password1 Valid Credentials rogerg@victim.						
password-lists	16:31:20 Spraying wit	th password: password12	html logon.html	vatio credentiats erichkevictim.compassword			
.gitignore	16:31:32 Spraying with password: password123						
README.md	16:32:00 Spraying wi	th password:]gwerty123					
passwords-English.txt	16:32:11 Spraying wit	th password: root vict					
spray.sh	16:32:23 Spraying wit	th password: admin.vict					
README.md	127.0.0	Lsso.cisco.vict	m.com				

Password Sprays

Step 3 – Use Tool to Guess At Passwords

Tool - CredMaster

root@chu:/opt/CredMaster# python3 credmaster.py --plugin o365 -u users.txt -p passwords.txt -a useragents.txt --config aws.config
[2021-03-03 20:52:01.876] Loading AWS configuration details from file: aws.config
[2021-03-03 20:52:01.876] Execution started at: 2021-03-03 20:52:01.876686
[2021-03-03 20:52:01.876] Creating 1 API Gateways for https://outlook.office365.com
[2021-03-03 20:52:02.966] Created API - Region: us-east-2 ID: (tmyrqvswoj) - https://tmyrqvswoj.execute-api.us-east-2.amazonaws.com
[2021-03-03 20:52:02.967] Total Regions Available: 15
[2021-03-03 20:52:02.967] Total API Gateways: 1
[2021-03-03 20:52:02.967] Starting Spray...

Benefits & Features

- · Rotates the requesting IP address for every request
- Automatically generates APIs for proxy passthru
- · Spoofs API tracking numbers, forwarded-for IPs, and other proxy tracking headers
- Multi-threaded processing
- Password delay counters & configuration for lockout policy evasion
- Easily add new plugins
- WeekdayWarrior setting for timed spraying and SOC evasion
- Fully anonymous

The following plugins are currently supported:

- OWA Outlook Web Access
- EWS Exchange Web Services
- 0365 Office365
- O365Enum Office365 User Enum (No Authentication Request)
- MSOL Microsoft Online
- Okta Okta Authentication Portal
- FortinetVPN Fortinet VPN Client
- HTTPBrute Generic HTTP Brute Methods (Basic/Digest/NTLM)
- ADFS Active Directory Federation Services
- AzureSSO Azure AD Seamless SSO Endpoint
- GmailEnum Gmail User Enumeration (No Authentication Request)

Popular Password Attack Types

Guessing - Sometimes it's not really fair to call it "guessing"

- Hard-coded and Default Passwords
 - Many devices come with well-known default passwords
 - Many people never change the well-known default passwords
 - Just google/bing for 'default password lists' and have fun
 - Many built-in passwords cannot be changed
- Has been one of the most popular ways people and devices are successfully attacked for decades
- Malware often takes advantage of this
- Becoming a much bigger problem with IoT



Password Guessing Defenses

- Change any default passwords immediately
- Use strong passwords
- Enable Account Lockout policies
- Enable failed logon monitoring/alerting
- Secure and monitor APIs
- Use phishing-resistant Multifactor Authentication (MFA) where you can


General Steps

- 1. Attacker somehow gets your password hashes
 - Normally takes elevated access and total compromise of a device and/or network to get, but not always
- 2. "Cracks" hashes back to plaintext passwords they represent Requires:
 - Password hash cracking "rig" with lots of computational power and memory
 - Cracking software (i.e., hashcat, John the Ripper, etc.)
- 3. Hacker uses or sells cracked plaintext passwords
- Can often reuse hashes without cracking to attack exploited site



Password Hash Basics

 In most authentication systems, passwords are stored and transmitted as cryptographic hashes (MD5, LM, NT, SHA1, SHA2, BCRYPT, etc.)

Hash Algorithm	Hash Result for frog
Message Digest5	938c2cc0dcc05f2b68c4287040cfcf71
(MD5)	
LANManager (LM)	71CF7241255BBEB4AAD3B435B51404EE
Windows NT (NT)	E3EBB26FE8A631171D218D084C76C982
SHA1	b3e0f62fa1046ac6a8559c68d231b6bd11345f36
SHA2-256	74fa5327cc0f4e947789dd5e989a61a8242986a596f170640ac90337b1da1ee4
BCrypt	\$2y\$10\$5lSoGVbVHgmVVvV2J5Cxt.RFJyjVA38InpRbIP/GZo5vQAetjnv9S

Password Hash Cracking Tools

- Once obtained, password hashes can be "cracked" back to their plaintext equivalents
- Big lists of passwords and their hashes are compared to stolen hashes
- Hash table 1:1 lookup
- Rainbow table converts passwords to an intermediate form for much faster hash comparisons

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User	LM Hash		NT Hash	F		LM Pwd 1	LM Pwd	2	NT Pwd	1
WDAGUtilityAc		9ff10e63522b948	89cc6a296	6400cd4da8						
Roger		c85ac51b1c76ee	6eee7d4	5ea47a6b986						
Tricia		cadf85840719818	8d209d7b	014d975cef				flower	68	
KathyL		8846f7eaee8fb11	17ad06bd	ld830b7586c				passw	ord	
Table	Status	Preload				Pri	ogress			
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Stealing Password Hashes

- Can be stolen from password storage files, databases, from memory, or from eavesdropping on network connections
- On a device, an attacker normally needs elevated access (i.e., administrator, root, etc.; plus a password hash theft tool
- On an Active Directory domain controller, attacker needs domain admin or better
- Man-in-the-middle (MitM) network attacks can steal password hashes or derive hashes from challenge/response sessions

Special Cases That Changes Everything

When attacker doesn't need elevated access to get hashes

- Password logons transmitted in plaintext across network
- Kerberoasting
- Email password hash theft trick

Special Case That Changes Everything

Kerberoasting

- Works on Active Directory-connected Microsoft Windows computers
- Attacker first compromises computer using any normal user account
- That account can be used to extract the NT hash from any Windows account with a Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN)
- So, any non-admin user can get hashes of the most privileged accounts
- NT hash can then be guessed against
- *This changes my previous, "weaker", password policy recommendations to be stronger

Phishing Password Hash Theft

Email Phishing Password Hash Capture Steps

- 1. Hacker creates/has a malicious web server on Internet
- 2. Creates a malicious URL address that links to object on web server
- 3. Sends link to victim (e.g., using email, etc.)
- 4. Victim clicks on URL link
- 5. Email program/browser attempts to retrieve object
- 6. Server says it requires an authenticated logon to access object
- 7. Email program/browser attempts authenticated logon
- 8. Sends remote logon attempt from which attacker can derive password hash



Phishing Password Hash Theft Demo

URL Click sends Your Password Hash

Kevin Mitnick demo

- Uses file://// trick
- https://blog.knowbe4.com/kevin-mitnick-demos-passwordhack-no-link-click-or-attachments-necessary
- I Can Get and Hack Your Password Hashes From Email
 - <u>https://www.csoonline.com/article/3333916/windows-</u> <u>security/i-can-get-and-crack-your-password-hashes-from-</u> <u>email.html</u>



Phishing Password Hash Theft Demo

Password Hash Capture - Kevin Mitnick Demo

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	POP3 server	[OFF]	
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Phishing Password Hash Theft

<u>Defenses</u>

- Require passwords with enough entropy to withstand cracking attempts
- Block unauthorized outbound authentication logons at perimeter and/or host
 - Port blocking: NetBIOS: UDP 137 & 138, TCP 139 & 445; LLMNR: UDP & TCP 5535; LDAP: UDP/TCP 389 & 636; SQL: TCP 1433; TCP 21; SMTP: TCP 25 & 587; POP: TCP 110 & 995; IMAP: TCP 143 & 993
 - Can you block on portable devices wherever the connect?
- Filter out inbound <u>file:////</u> links
- Optional Microsoft patch and registry configuration settings:

https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV170014

How Fast Can Password Hashes Be Cracked?

Hash types are not equal. Cracking speed depends on type of hash being cracked

 When you hear of "cracking speed" usually people are talking about Windows NT hashes (often called NTLM, but NTLM is a network protocol not a type of hash)

Easy to Hard Crack

- NT hashes are moderately hard to crack (used unsalted in Microsoft Windows)
- SHA1/SHA2 harder to crack (salted SHA2-256 bit used in most Apple/Linux/Unix OSes)
- PBKDF2 used in Windows 10/Apple/Linux for some operations is fairly hard
- BCRYPT harder to crack (but loses to PBKDF2 after 55-characters)



- Hashes + Software + CPU cycles + RAM
- Most common cracking tool is hashcat
- Graphics Processing Units (GPUs)
- "Rigs" full of GPUs
- Appliances
 - Ex. Terahash \$25,499, 375+ GPUs
- Clouds, Clusters, Parallel Processing

How Fast Can Password Hashes Be Cracked?

- Many rigs can crack NT password hashes at 2TH/s (2 trillion tries a second)
 - This would be considered the top tier performance level of "normal" password hash cracking rigs
- Some elite top rigs can crack at 10's of TH/s
- Top bitcoin miners have 100's of TH/s which is probably what nationstates have
- 100's of TH/s can be bought for \$50-\$100/hr in clouds

How Fast Can Password Hashes Be Cracked?

Password hash cracking speed on 45TH/s rig on perfect random passwords

				Pas	sword Ler	igth		
<u>Hash</u>	Eff. Speed	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>
LM	15.81 TH/s	instant	instant	instant	instant	instant	instant	instant
NT	31.82 TH/s	instant	instant	3.5 min	5.5 hrs	3 wks	5.6 yrs	538 yrs
MD5	17.77 TH/s	instant	instant	6 min	10 hrs	9 wks	10.1 yrs	963 yrs
SHA1	5.89 TH/s	instant	instant	19 min	29 hrs	15 wks	30.6 yrs	2.9M yrs
SHA2-256	2.42 TH/s	instant	instant	45.5 min	3 days	37 wks	74.25 yrs	7.1M yrs
SHA2-512	801.9 GH/s	instant	instant	2.25 hrs	9 days	28 mon	225 yrs	21.4M yrs
BCRYPT	11.37 MH/s	18 hrs	9 wks	59 yrs	5.6M yrs	534M yrs	50744M	4820655M

Data from: https://t.co/NKYIrKwUDb

This is why you need 12character perfectly random passwords

How Long Should Your Password Be To Be Considered Uncrackable?

- NT hash from perfectly random password: At least 12-characters
 - SHA2-256-bit: At least 11-chars Bcrypt: 8-9 chars
- NT hash from "normal" complexity passphrase: At least 20-characters
 - At least 30-characters to prevent theoretical or future attacks
- Windows passwords should be 15-characters long to disable LM hashes

 That's why using MFA and/or password manager when possible is preferred, followed by passphrases

Password Hash Theft

Password Hash Basics

• Remember, hashes can be re-used without cracking in many systems,

including Microsoft Windows and Active Directory

- Pass-the-Hash attack tools
 - Mimikatz
 - WinCe
 - NTLMRelay



root@kali:~# ntmlrelayx.py -tf victims.txt -c <shellcodehere>

Password Hash Theft

Password Hash Basics – Stolen Hashes

Defenses:

- Prevent attackers from getting the hashes in the first place!!
- Very long (and complex) passwords can prevent successful cracking
- Prevent social engineering best you can
- Use AV/EDR to prevent hacker tools from being used to steal hashes
- Check with individual vendors for their own solutions
 - i.e., Microsoft (e.g., Protected LSASS, etc.)

Password Attacks

Popular Password Attack Types

Account Takeover Recoveries

Account password reset methods can be used by hackers to take over people's accounts

Microsoft account

Security code

Please use the following security code for the Microsoft account ro*****@hotmail.com.

Security code: 0152772

If you don't recognize the Microsoft account ro*****@hotmail.com, you can click here to remove your email address from that account.

Thanks, The Microsoft account team From Google Security: We have detected a rogue sign-in to your goodguy@gmail.com account credentials. In order to determine the legitimate login we're going to send a verification code to your previously registered phone number from another Google support number. Please re-type the sent verification code in response to this message or your account will be permanently locked.



Sent



Hacking Into Your Email Using Recovery Methods

Password Reset Questions

The worst recovery method on the planet is password recovery questions

 Usually REQUIRED by many web sites, you can't create a new account without them

Your Security Question	ons	
Question:	What is the name of the camp you attended as a child?	•
Answer:	*****	
Repeat Answer:	******	
Question:	What is the first name of your favorite Aunt?	۲
Answer:	*****	
Repeat Answer:	********	
Question:	What is the zip code of the address where you grew up?	٠
Answer:	Special characters, such as / and -, are not allowed	
Repeat Answer:		
Question:	What is the name of the street where you grew up?	٠
Answer:	*****	
Repeat Answer:	*****	



Hacking Into Your Email Using Recovery Methods

Problem: Answers can often be easily guessed by hackers

Great Google paper called Secrets, Lies, and Account Recovery: Lessons from the Use of Personal

Knowledge Questions at Google

http://www.a51.nl/sites/default/files/pdf/43783.pdf

- 20% of some recovery questions can be guessed on first try by hacker
- 40% of people were unable to successfully recall their own recovery answers
- 16% of answers could be found in person's social media profile
- Attack has been involved in many well known attacks (e.g. Sarah Palin's compromised email)

Rogue Recoveries

Defense: New	ver answer the question	s with the real	answers!
Question:	What was your high school mascot?	•]
Answer:	pizzapizza\$vgad2@M1		
Repeat Answer:	****		
Question:	What is your mother's middle name?	•	
Answer:	*****		
Repeat Answer:	*****		
Question:	What is your father's birthdate? (mmdd)	7]
Answer:	***************************************		
Question:	What is the name of your best friend from high school?	T]
Answer:	*****		
Repeat Answer:	*****		

Defense

Unfortunately, that means you have to record them somewhere else just like passwords (password managers help with this)

Password Attacks

Popular Password Attack Types

Ask For It

- You'd be amazed how many people give up their passwords to strangers who ask for them
- I've often asked people for their passwords
- Jimmy Kimmel password video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=opRMrEfAlil





Agenda

Types of Password Attacks and Defenses
Password Policy Recommendations



Password Policy

Password Policy Components

- Length
- Complexity (i.e., character types/sets required)
- Useful lifetime/expiration period
- How long till password can be re-used in same system by same person
- Account Lockout enabled/disabled
- Rules (such as Can't be a "common" password or Can't be your logon name)
- Don't forget: You must protect all involved components!!



Password Policy Practical Implementation





For more detail: https://info.knowbe4.com/wp-password-policy-should-be

Which Password Attack Types...

Don't Care About "Strong" Passwords?

- Social Engineering
- Stealing
- Lookups
- Account Takeover (ATO) Recoveries
- Asking

Are Impacted by "Strong" Passwords?

- Guessing
- Hash Cracking
 - (but does not stop hash reuse and may be game over anyway)

The vast majority of password attacks are this type



Password Policy

What is password complexity?

- It's known as *entropy*...randomness of something
 - Traditional password theory follows something called "Shannon entropy" guidelines
- Truly random passwords are hard for humans to make and remember
- What we think is a complex password
 - RogerisaG0on
 - RogerGrimes3
- What truly random, high entropy, passwords look like
 -]}7Y?@w@?)Nmt4h7
 - J.MF.F)RGzHk4y}x
 - CYADB_d},R->Z>C2



Password Policy

Problem with Complexity?

- Really hard to require true randomness/high entropy
- Humans like to use easier to remember patterns and root words
- The average human-generated complex password is:
 - Uppercase first letter
 - Lowercase second letter which is a vowel
 - If number required, 1 or 2 at end
 - If symbol is required, it's likely a @ or ! or # or \$ or &
- Ex: Rogerishere2 or R0gerg
- Did I describe some of your passwords?
- Harder to guess but not that hard to crack



Passwords Strength Checkers

Online Password Strength Checking Sites

- https://howsecureismypassword.net/
- https://password.kaspersky.com/
- https://thycotic.com/resources/password-strength-checker
- http://www.passwordmeter.com
- https://www.howsecureismypassword.io/
- Caution: Any website asking you to submit your real password to determine strength could be using your submission against your interests
 - Use another similar, but not identical password submission to get the same information.
 - For ex: If your password is Dogdog32 use CatCat23





Password Strength

Length vs. Complexity

How long to crack the hashes of these passwords?

Rogergri2

It would take a computer about

3 DAYS to crack your password]}7Y?@w@?)Nmt4h7 rogerjumpedoverthedogandcat

It would take a computer about 41 TRILLION YEARS to crack your password

	It would take a computer about
4	OUINTILLION YEARS
1	to crack your password

Both are hard to crack, but which is easier to remember and use?

Using https://howsecureismypassword.net/



Password Managers

- The best password to fight all attack types is a very long and complex password
- But requiring a human to do it can be self-defeating
 - So says NIST SP 800-63
- Instead, if you need truly long and complex passwords, try to use/require a password manager instead
- Password managers allow a different long and complex password to be used on most web sites and services
 - Just a keystroke combination or few clicks of a mouse to logon
 - Autologon



Password Managers

- Create and store and allow easy use of long and complex passwords
- Most have many other features
- Free and commercial
- A few allow enterprise management
- Many very good password manager programs out there
- My recommendation: Use one that has been out for a long time and has many "real" reviews
- Check out: <u>https://www.wired.com/story/best-password-managers/</u>



Password Managers





Password Managers

Negatives

- Don't work with all devices, browsers, or sites/services
- One stop shop for hackers and malware that are looking to get your passwords
- Can be buggy
- Can be tough to use until you get use to it
- Seems every other website has a different password policy...it's a pain
- Single point of failure
- https://blog.knowbe4.com/what-about-password-manager-risks





Multifactor Authentication

- Significantly mitigates some types of hacker attacks
 - Especially broadcast phishes asking you to logon with a password

Negatives

- Can't be used on most sites/services
- Can be hacked, sometimes easily so
- If you use MFA, you <u>must</u> train users about how they can still be hacked, including attacks against their type of MFA and how to avoid


Resilient MFA Solutions

My List of Good, Strong MFA

https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/my-list-good-strong-mfa-roger-grimes

Don't Use Easily Phishable MFA and That's Most MFA!

https://blog.knowbe4.com/do-not-use-easily-phishable-mfa

US Government Says to Avoid Phishing-Resistant MFA and Why Is the Majority of Our MFA So Phishable?

 https://blog.knowbe4.com/u.s.-government-says-to-avoid-phishing-resistantmfa



Monitoring Recommendations

Monitoring and Alerting

- Alert for an abnormal # of failed logins in a given time period
 - For a single account
 - In aggregate
 - For an unusual number of accounts (stops credential stuffing attacks)
- Alert for an abnormal # of account lockout warnings
- Alert on strange network logon pathway flows
 - Logons for devices that don't normally logon to other devices



Other Recommendations

Other Checks

- Do account credential hygiene
 - Remove the accounts you don't need
 - Put MFA and/or strong passwords on the ones you do need
 - Reduce permanent memberships of privileged groups to as near zero as you can
 - Enable "check-out" methods and monitoring of elevated accounts
- Secure any remotely accessible APIs
 - They often don't have account lockout, allow MFA, or are monitored as closely
- Do an account audit to ensure that all existing (active) accounts have strong passwords
 - It's easy for older accounts to somehow get bypassed or not follow the newer policies
 - Check those interfaces and legacy systems



Password Policy ebook



https://info.knowbe4.com/wp-password-policy-should-be



KnowBe4 Security Awareness Training

Baseline Testing

We provide baseline testing to assess the Phish-Prone[™] percentage of your users through a free simulated phishing attack.

Real Train Your Users

The world's largest library of security awareness training content; including interactive modules, videos, games, posters and newsletters. Automated training campaigns with scheduled reminder emails.

? Phish Your Users

Best-in-class, fully automated simulated phishing attacks, thousands of templates with unlimited usage, and community phishing templates.

See the Results

Enterprise-strength reporting, showing stats and graphs for both training and phishing, ready for management. Show the great ROI!





Generating Industry-Leading Results and ROI

- Reduced Malware and Ransomware Infections
- Reduced Data Loss
- Reduced Potential Cyber-theft
- Increased User Productivity
- Users Have Security Top of Mind

85% Average Improvement

Across all industries and sizes from baseline testing to one year or more of ongoing training and testing



Source: 2022 KnowBe4 Phishing by Industry Benchmarking Report

Note: The initial Phish-prone Percentage is calculated on the basis of all users evaluated. These users had not received any training with the KnowBe4 console prior to the evaluation. Subsequent time periods reflect Phish-prone Percentages for the subset of users who received training with the KnowBe4 console.

Questions?

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